In Praise of Divided Government by Epstein, Richard A.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 68 
Issue 3 Federalist Society Symposium: The Presidency and Congress—Constitutionally 
Separated and Shared Powers 
1990 
In Praise of Divided Government 
Richard A. Epstein 
University of Chicago 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Law and Politics Commons, and the Legislation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard A. Epstein, In Praise of Divided Government, 68 WASH. U. L. Q. 567 (1990). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol68/iss3/8 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
IN PRAISE OF DIVIDED GOVERNMENT
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*
After Lloyd Cutler's defense of a system of unified government, I think
that it is best to get right down to business. When it comes to this partic-
ular discussion, there really is a deep and fundamental gulf between us,
geographical and intellectual, which accounts in large measure for the
different perspectives that we bring to the problem of separation of pow-
ers. I come from my adopted home on the South Side of Chicago. Lloyd
Cutler comes from the pulse and power of Washington. The intellectual
differences follow from the geographical difference, for we have in fact
very different senses of what it means for government to "work." In my
view, you measure the success or failure of government, not by the vol-
ume of legislation that it generates, but by whatever increment of good it
adds to human welfare, or as is typically the case, by the relatively small
level of harm it inflicts upon social institutions. The correct way to look
at things is with the strong presumption that the more legislation you
have, the worse that government works.
That presumption influences the way one looks at the procedural and
structural questions of separation of powers. It is not possible to decide
on the abstract merits of separation wholly devoid of the legislation that
is produced. In any serious inquiry, you have to examine the legislation
that comes through first in periods of divided, and then in periods of
unified government. You have to decide which legislative outcomes you
prefer on the merits, and why, and then you must select that particular
set of institutions that leads to the outcomes that you defend on in-
dependent, substantive grounds. Procedure is a means of getting the
right substance. It is not an end in itself.
When I think of the important periods of unified government, I think
of the New Deal and of the Great Society. In my view these are fitting
indictments of the principle of unified government because the legislation
that they enacted has been enormously destructive and detrimental to
human welfare. That is a political judgment, and an outspoken judg-
ment, even if made by a law professor---one, I might add, whose views
are likely to disqualify him permanently from any responsible position of
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political power in Washington. But there is something to be said for
having some of us reside permanently outside the corridors of power, if
only because we shall be a little less reluctant to speak our minds. So I
want to criticize as an academic, the way that Lloyd has analyzed the
data, in order to show that his conclusions are, in my judgment,
backwards.
Start with his argument that people do not know the consequences of
their voting behavior. Really, he thinks, they do prefer to have a unified
government, but then find that divided government is a surprise conse-
quence of their voting choices. Yet it is a mistake to assume that there
are any surprise, or random consequences from voting behavior. If ran-
dom outcomes were the norm, then you would expect to see unified gov-
ernment about half of the time and divided government the other half of
the time. The fact that you observe (at least since 1950) a consistent set
of outcomes-here with divided government-suggests that this is what
people in general want. There is a good theoretical reason to see why
they might want it.
The explanation runs as follows. Overall there are consistent pressures
by a majority of the electorate for a small government. That choice can
be expressed by taking the Presidential candidate who, all other things
being equal, is going to keep the overall size of government small. In
recent years that translates into a Republican President, and even the one
exception, Jimmy Carter, was to a large extent an outsider who ran
against Washington in his successful 1976 campaign. Nonetheless, these
same self-interested voters are often concerned with having the largest
possible share of that smaller pie come in the direction of their district.
Even if Republicans and Democrats were equally adroit at milking
Washington for local purposes, the Democrats would have a slight ad-
vantage in local elections because the voters that elect them into office
can still keep the overall size of government down by choosing a Republi-
can President. There are, of course, many other factors at work-the
advantages of incumbency in winning elections, and of seniority in aiding
in "constituent" service-but even when these are taken into account, I
think that this dual strategy-keep the pie small, but my slice large-
gives some explanation why divided government is the preferred electoral
outcome today. We can expect to see Republican Presidents and Demo-
cratic Congresses for some time to come.
Now the interesting question raised by Lloyd's data is this: Why is the
trend toward divided government more pronounced in the years after
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1950 than it is in the years before 1950? In order to understand the
difference, I do not think it is sufficient to look to a mere change in the
tastes of American voters. I think, as always, that it is necessary to go
back to structural fundamentals. Separation of powers is simply one of a
wide range of techniques that was adopted by the framers in order to
limit the scope and size of government. In order to understand how the
full mosaic works, two other pieces have to be added to the puzzle. One
of these concerns the scope of federal power, and the other concerns the
level of protection of individual rights to economic liberty and property
that are accorded under the Constitution.
I believe that there is an important equilibrium among these three sep-
arate components to constitutional theory. Let us start with separation
of powers, which includes the entire system of checks and balances. The
model for that structure is largely derived from large private bodies,
whether corporate, charitable, or religious. The organizers of these pri-
vate, voluntary organizations have always understood that if you make
life too easy for persons who hold positions of fiduciary responsibility,
they will steal you blind. So while every organization needs some chief
executive officer, his powers have to be confined by a board of directors
and other social actors in order to prevent looting and other more genteel
forms of misconduct.
The need for these kinds of checks and balances is, if anything, more
pressing because political institutions are not organized around con-
senting individuals, but are composed of strange bedfellows who have
little in common with each other. You do not pick your fellow citizens in
politics; they are forced upon you by the bonds of political union, and
there is no obvious way to dissolve the political bonds that hold you to-
gether, short of revolution. This peculiar configuration of "sharehold-
ers" in the joint political venture is subject to greater tensions than the
ordinary private, voluntary association, so that the set of institutional
safeguards that must be put in place is likely to be complicated and
elaborate.
It is for that reason that our Constitution made it so difficult to pass
any new legislation. The various rules of separation of powers-two
houses, the veto, the override-represent a highly intelligent effort to cre-
ate some "filter" through which public-regarding legislation is more
likely to pass because there will be less political opposition. In contrast,
factional legislation will more likely be trapped by the political filter be-
cause determined opposition to the legislation will likely be able to block
1990]
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its passage at one particular juncture. Separation of powers and the sys-
tem of checks and balances thus work as a crude filter which is more
likely to block partisan legislation than social legislation. To give a sim-
ple example, you are more likely to get a statute of frauds or a statute of
limitations-both acceptable interferences with the common law set of
liberties, at least if well constructed-than some bitterly divisive system
of transfer payments to farmers, loggers or real estate developers.
The descriptive question, however, is this: How reliable and robust
will the cost barrier created by the system of checks and balances remain
over time? Here the assessment is mixed. One good feature about the
structural limitations of a system of divided power is that the constitu-
tional provisions that create them are relatively impervious to judicial
misconstruction. Twenty-five years (the minimum age to serve in the
House of Representatives) means twenty-five man years, not dog years.
A two-thirds vote of each house to override a Presidential veto means
two-thirds, not sixty percent and not seventy-five percent. As the Consti-
tution is pummelled over time, these structural clauses are far less likely
to be bent out of shape than the takings or the commerce clause. The
constantly shifting composition of the various key positions-Presidency,
House and Senate-make it more difficult for any political faction to line
up its ducks in a row. The structural limitations, therefore, continue to
bite today.
Nonetheless, we should expect, alas, that their effectiveness will erode
slowly but steadily over time. The reason is that the benefits that are
obtainable from forming the winning coalition are not constant over
time. They are in large measure a function of the other two variables-
the scope of congressional power and the protection the courts afford to
individual economic liberties or property rights. And it is here that the
lamentable constitutional blunders of the 1937 New Deal Court cut most
deeply. The broad construction accorded to the commerce power thus
increased dramatically the range of activities over which Congress could
legislate. The greater the scope of its legislation, the greater the wealth
and opportunities it could transfer by factional decisions. While the con-
gressional plate previously had been fairly limited, after 1937 it became
perpetually full. It follows, therefore, that the wheeling and dealing in
Congress will necessarily increase because there are more objects over
which wheeling and dealing can take place.
Are there any side constraints against wheeling and dealing? Some
were in place when there was a semblance of a strong contracts clause, or
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of solid protection of economic liberties under the due process clause.
Parties who lost to factional intrigue had some prospect of obtaining re-
lief in court, and the mere threat of a successful suit would reduce the
likelihood that any factional legislation would pass. In this corner as
well, the threat of judicial invalidation is far weaker because of the jejune
protection afforded economic liberties today, even against retroactive
invalidation.
There is, therefore, a radical shift in the constitutional equilibrium.
The gains from partisan activities in Congress are much more substantial
today than they were in 1950. The barriers to partisan activities-
namely separation of powers-are surely no stronger and may well be a
tad weaker, if only because the communication and coordination neces-
sary for faction building come at a lower cost. Because the effectiveness
of the formal constraints against legislation have not been buttressed,
while the gains from overcoming these limitations have been magnified,
we should expect to see what we have seen: a massive increase in legisla-
tive action, with its untold and pointless redistributive slant. The barri-
ers against factional legislation created by a system of checks and
balances have been largely offset by the erosion of the limitations on con-
gressional power, individual liberties and property rights in the economic
sphere. There is more reason to spend the resources to overcome the
structural impediments to legislation.
Well, then, what do people do when they start to observe this cycle of
behavior? At one level the response is egotistic: "It is just wonderful to
watch the legislative wheels turn when I am on the receiving end. The
game is great to play when the goodies come in my direction." But if we
play this game a large number of times, winning a fair share of the
rounds is not enough. If there are a thousand rolls of the dice and I win
10 on each of 500 rolls but lose 20 on the other 500 rolls, then I am worse
off to the tune of 5000. That is exactly what happens when a faction
controls, because the political gains to the winners are always smaller
than the losses sustained by the losers; the winning political actors ignore
the costs that their actions impose on others. So looking at this melee,
voters have a greater preference for divided government as a way to slow
down the political juggernaut. It is exactly the right response to take,
although it may be of relatively limited effectiveness, given the enormous
structural problems that we face with an overstuffed government in
Washington.
But how do we know this? Again it is very hard to be definitive on the
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subject without looking at some substantive themes. Let me point to a
couple examples of the follies that persist even with so-called divided
government. First, there are many issues in which there is some loose
political consensus that cuts across political lines. At this point separa-
tion of powers, checks and balances, will fail, and one often sees very bad
legislation. My favorite candidate of the day for silly, destructive, and
pernicious legislation-as I have said I am not running for public office
in Washington-is the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. When
that statute passes by a unanimous vote in the House and the Senate,
then the faith in separation of powers is dashed by the political fads of
the time, against which there is no constitutional safeguard. But all is
not lost, for when one considers another piece of silly and pernicious
legislation-an increase in the minimum wage-then even a little bit of
grit in the White House will reduce the size of the increase by the threat
of the veto. So separation of powers does make a difference, at least some
of the time, and by keeping out undesirable legislation continues to dis-
charge some part of its original constitutional function.
There is one more point I should like to address before closing. What
do we make of the deficits of the Reagan years? Here it seems to me that
you have to be careful to understand what you are measuring. Lloyd
Cutler has expressed a deep concern with the deficit. I for one do not see
any economic argument that says that a three percent deficit per year is
not sustainable over the long haul. Lloyd and I must have talked to
different economists for we have radically different understandings as to
what ails us as a nation in the current state of affairs. In my view his
arguments about the deficit confuse two key variables. Variable number
one is the size of the deficit, to which he attaches excessive weight. Vari-
able number two is the total size of government expenditures, whether
financed by taxes, borrowing or, for that matter, inflation. In my view
this second variable is the critical one: The right question to ask is what
is the total level of government expenditures relative to the optimal level?
Today with the enormous size of government, we can be confident that
a huge fraction of government expenditures impose social costs, taxes or
borrowings, that are far greater than the total benefits they generate.
While I am not a supporter of no government, in the current state of
affairs, the first order of business for a responsible President is to limit the
total size of government expenditures, for which a President will receive
solid political support. If you as President increase the level of effective
taxes, that step will do little to reduce the deficit. It will instead be an
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open invitation for Congress to increase its expenditure levels so that
when the dust settles the deficit remains more or less at the same level it
was before the tax increase. Accordingly, the way to understand the defi-
cit in the present setting is as a political maneuver by the executive
branch to keep the total level of spending down, a required maneuver
given that the other structural restraints on congressional power have
been dismantled or overrun.
The bottom line, therefore, is that separation of powers, checks and
balances, should be treated as a means to an end. The only way that this
end can be rightly understood is with a healthy dose of public choice
theory, which should animate your coming and your going in public life.
When most outputs of Congress are redistributive, then the best way to
make government work is to see that its wheels grind slowly so that as
little harm as possible is done. And that spells a great appreciation for
the now neglected virtues of separation of powers.
1990]
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol68/iss3/8
